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Abstract: 
The paper investigates the productivity level of technology transfer offices (TTOs) affiliated to 
Spanish public universities. The proposed approach allows the development of a framework that 
matches universities’ technology transfer concerns with the need to accurately analyze the role 
of the outcome configuration of technology transfer offices (TTOs). We analyze the 
productivity of Spanish TTOs during 2006-2011 by computing total factor productivity models 
rooted in non-parametric techniques, namely the Malmquist index. The results confirm that 
technology transfer productivity is affected by changes in the configuration of the TTO’s 
outcome portfolio that result from benchmarking own and market peers’ performance levels. 
While benchmarking own performance levels facilitates the exploitation of internal resources 
and yields superior productivity results, changes in TTO’s portfolio based on comparisons with 
market peers might generate greater operational costs that negatively impact productivity. 
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Assessing the productivity of technology transfer offices: An analysis of the 
relevance of aspiration performance and portfolio complexity 
 
1. Introduction 
Universities are organizations that perform a key role within contemporary societies by 
educating large proportions of the population and generating various forms of valuable 
knowledge. Recently, often on the initiative of policy-makers, many universities have taken 
action to develop a ‘third mission’ by fostering links with knowledge users and facilitating 
technology transfer (Etzkowitz et al. 2000; Dill 2014). Governments have traditionally 
channeled considerable resources to finance scientific outcomes and technology transfer 
activities, either through tax policy or direct investment. Additionally, the growing awareness of 
the importance of knowledge transfer activities as key pillars for the consolidation of 
knowledge-based economies has led European governing bodies to adopt specific policies 
within the EU 2020 strategic plan aimed at stimulating knowledge creation and diffusion, as 
well as scientific productivity among universities (European Commission 2015). 
The increased emphasis on the commercialization of technology transfer outcomes to 
the private sector has stimulated many universities to create Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs). TTOs can be seen as knowledge brokers that encourage technology transfer processes 
from academia to industry by bringing together scientists, businesses and venture capitalists 
(Friedman and Silberman 2003; Macho-Stadler et al. 2007; Sellenthin 2009). 
From an organizational perspective, TTOs are separate units created within universities 
whose primary role relates to the management of technology transfer processes. Nevertheless, 
TTOs do not materialize the generally positive outcomes of their technology transfer efforts at 
the same intensity. The outputs of technology transfer—i.e., spinoffs, licenses, and patents—are 
not only heterogeneous between TTOs, but also in terms of the factors explaining variations in 
TTOs’ productivity over time. TTOs are challenged with the need to harmonize scientists’ 
interests—who often prioritize their scientific productivity—with the exploitation of their 
resources to transfer the new knowledge generated within the university to the industry. A 
common presumption is that TTOs must maximize their outcomes. Yet, different resources, 
abilities and internal processes are necessary to generate technology transfer outcomes. 
Additionally, TTOs’ performance may be affected by resource allocation policies and by 
strategic choices linked to the TTO’s outcome portfolio that are not necessarily conducive to 
technology transfer outputs. 
This is the focus of this study. More concretely, we evaluate the technology transfer 
efficiency of Spanish TTOs via total factor productivity models rooted in non-parametric 
techniques (Malmquist index). Additionally, we explore the role on TTOs’ productivity of 
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strategic choices linked to changes in the configuration of the TTO’s technology transfer 
portfolio based on the benchmarking of own and other TTOs performance aspiration levels. 
The empirical application considers the TTOs affiliated to Spanish public universities 
between 2006 and 2011. This setting is attractive because, similar to other European countries, 
Spain has undergone significant reforms in the university’s regulatory framework seeking to 
parameterize technology transfer outcomes and enhance publicly funded technology transfer 
activities (Caldera and Debande 2010; Lafuente and Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). This implies 
drastic modifications in the universities’ strategic model in which TTOs play a key role. The 
Spanish setting offers the opportunity to analyze how TTOs capitalize on their resources 
seeking to produce technology transfer outcomes in a context in which information availability 
gives TTOs strong incentives to benchmark their own and other TTOs seeking to introduce 
changes that might enhance their productivity levels. 
Notwithstanding the increased relevance of transferring technology generated within 
universities to the industry for policy makers and universities, the majority of work has analyzed 
technology transfer performance from a university perspective (e.g., Thursby and Thursby 2002; 
Clarysse et al. 2005; Caldera and Debande 2010; Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013), while few 
articles have specifically dealt with the functioning of TTOs from a theoretical (e.g., Macho-
Stadler et al. 2007) or empirical perspective (e.g., Siegel et al. 2003; Chappel et al. 2005).  
The analysis of the relationship between benchmarking and changes in the strategic 
orientation of TTOs has been largely sidelined in prior research. TTOs are not monolithic 
organizations and we argue that performance feedback triggers different strategies that 
materialize in changes in the configuration of TTOs’ outputs, and that these strategic changes 
impact TTOs’ productivity. 
In this sense, this paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, the main 
contribution of this work is to analyze the TTO’s adaptive behavior through aspiration-
performance feedback models. By drawing from the organizational theory literature (e.g., 
Levinthal and March 1981; Labianca et al. 2009), the proposed analysis allows us to evaluate 
how benchmark-driven strategic change impacts TTOs’ productivity. We propose that TTOs 
benchmark their own past record and other peers, and that this valuable information motivates 
change in the strategic orientation of TTOs’ output portfolio. By explicitly linking aspiration-
performance feedback with productivity patterns, this study answers the call made by Siegel et 
al. (2007) and Fitzgerald and Cunningham (2016) for more research on the relationship between 
the strategy making of TTOs and performance. Our results suggesting that enhanced 
productivity follows organizational change based on the evaluation of the TTOs’ own historical 
record contribute to better understand how performance feedback impacts TTOs’ strategic 
actions and, consequently, subsequent productivity. 
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Additionally, this study extends the rich literature on the technology transfer 
performance of publicly funded organizations (see, e.g., Feldman et al. 2002; Thursby and 
Kemp 2002; Clarysse et al. 2005; Siegel et al. 2007; Sellenthin 2009; Caldera and Debande 
2010; Algieri et al. 2013; Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013; Kim 2013; Vinig and Lips 2015). The 
analysis of the role of resource specialization on TTO’s performance has been mostly 
unaddressed in previous empirical research (e.g., Chappel et al., 2005; Anderson et al. 2007). 
Thus, a second contribution of this study is to measure TTOs’ productivity patterns via a 
modeling strategy that accurately reflects TTOs’ technology by integrating specific inputs 
linked to the workforce specialization in the efficiency analysis. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
underpinning. Section 3 presents the main characteristics of the Spanish university system. 
Section 4 describes the data and the methodological approach, while Section 5 offers the 
empirical results. In Section 6 the discussion is presented, and the final section provides the 
concluding remarks, implications and future research lines. 
 
2. Background theory 
2.1 Knowledge generation and the reconciling role of technology transfer offices 
The rise of the knowledge-based economy in advanced countries has attracted increased 
attention on the creation and commercialization of knowledge generated within universities via 
different mechanisms (patents, licensing contracts, and the creation of university-based spin-
offs). In recent decades, existing organizations—most notably universities—have witnessed a 
major change in their role and they are now submitted to new challenges as society advances in 
science and technology (Dill 2014). In this context, many voices have claimed for a deeper 
involvement of universities with various stakeholders via a closer association between industry 
and science (Perkmann et al. 2013). The universities’ third mission—interaction with 
surrounding stakeholders—implies the provision of new knowledge, experience and 
technological solutions to industry demands (Schattock 2009). 
University research can spur business innovation, foster competitiveness, and promote 
economic development (Algieri et al. 2013). The institutional changes underwent by universities 
have increased the incentives to remain at the cutting-edge of research, recruit highly skilled 
human capital, and develop appropriate mechanisms and infrastructures to accelerate the 
valorization process of knowledge. Accordingly, there is a large body of research assessing the 
drivers and outcomes of technology transfer at the university level (Thursby and Thursby 2002; 
Clarysse et al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2007; Caldera and Debande 2010; Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 
2013; Kim 2013; Hsu et al. 2015; Agasisti and Wolszczak-Derlacz 2015).  
The increased emphasis on transferring technology to the private sector for 
commercialization has led many universities to create new organizational forms—Technology 
 5 
 
Transfer Offices (TTOs)—to legitimize their commercial activities (Siegel et al. 2007). Starting 
in the US in the 1980s but rapidly expanding to other countries, TTOs have been included in 
universities’ organizational structure as independent units whose primary objective is to bring 
together academics, businesses and venture capitalists, and promote knowledge transfer from 
academia to industry (Algieri et al. 2013). The role of TTOs mostly consists of spreading an 
entrepreneurial culture of research, encourage the dissemination of scientific outcomes and 
support scholars through the stages of research commercialization (Caldera and Debande, 
2010). Also, by employing its recourses to build strong networks the TTO contributes to reduce 
barriers between scientists and industry (Friedman and Silberman 2003). 
Knowledge is disseminated and commercialized in the form of scientific publications, 
license contracts or patents. Research outcomes can also be the starting point for the creation of 
a new venture. Technology transfer activities and scientific excellence are mutually reinforcing 
(Baldini 2009); however, previous studies show that this process has taken place at different 
rates and intensities (Shattock 2009), and that these transformations are highly tied with the 
strategic vision of each TTO. Although the increased usability of university innovations by 
industry (Kim 2013), the commercialization of knowledge generated within universities is hard 
and certain discrepancies between academia and industry might affect this process. 
First, universities and industry have different objectives. While market-oriented firms 
prioritize research low in riskiness with direct marketability, public universities mostly focus on 
the development of projects with a longer time horizon and uncertain commercial applications 
(Di Gregorio and Shane 2003). Second, a discrepancy exists on how to capitalize new 
knowledge. Scholars mostly facilitate the diffusion of new knowledge as a public good by fully 
disclosing work methods and results linked to the new knowledge. On contrary, businesses seek 
to secure the control of intellectual property and the potential future rents resulting from the new 
knowledge. Additionally, scientists have strong incentives to share their research as quickly as 
possible via scientific publications, while the industry is interested in delaying the publication 
process to keep scientific results with potential economic value hidden (Anderson et al. 2007). 
Third, prior research shows that scientists’ dissimilar involvement in technology 
transfer might result from a weak system of incentives (Siegel et al. 2007). Universities often 
evaluate faculty on the basis of systems that link a successful academic career to valuable 
research accomplishments, which sways scholars to produce academically rigorous research and 
develop research networks (Lafuente and Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). Thus, many scientists lack 
the skills and abilities both to engage in commercial activities and create or develop university-
industry collaborations (Perkmann and Walsh 2009), and may explain the highly skewed 
distribution of successful commercialization among universities (Vinig and Lips 2015). 
A growing literature stream has evaluated why some TTOs are more successful than 
others in commercializing research outcomes (see e.g., Anderson et al. 2007; Wright et al. 
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2007). Results are inconclusive. Notwithstanding the diverse and complex attributions of TTOs 
complicate the creation of accurate metrics to capture their performance (Perkman et al. 2013; 
Hsu et al. 2015); it seems that organizational practices and resource allocation strategies explain 
a significant proportion of the variation of TTOs’ performance (Anderson et al. 2007; Siegel et 
al. 2007; Balsmeier and Pellens 2014). 
Within TTOs, scientists are the suppliers of valuable and potentially marketable 
knowledge (Siegel et al. 2007). The transfer of knowledge and technology from university to 
industry appears in a myriad of forms that include formal (i.e., patents, R&D contracts, licenses, 
spin-offs) and informal (i.e. personal contacts, industry-science networks, cooperation in 
education) outcomes.  
From an organizational perspective, the biggest challenge for TTOs is to harmonize the 
elements of their production function, including scientists—who often pursue scientific 
productivity—and their specific resources—i.e., staff specialized in knowledge-transfer 
activities and administrative support staff—to effectively exploit the knowledge generated 
within the university. Underlying prior research analyses is the assumption that TTOs must 
maximize their technology transfer outcomes (Anderson et al. 2007). Nevertheless, different 
resources, abilities and internal processes are necessary to produce the various TTO outcomes; 
and TTOs’ performance might be affected by both the allocation of resources and strategic 
choices that are not always conducive to the TTO outputs.  
In a context where strategic choices condition TTOs’ performance, variations in the 
configuration of the TTO’s portfolio might result from the performance evaluation of the TTOs’ 
own historical records as well as from the benchmarking of other TTOs’ actions. The policy 
significance of this issue lies in the need to gain insights into the value of the TTOs’ outcomes 
currently being pursued by exploiting their resources. Such outcomes are the consequence of 
TTOs’ efforts for encouraging technology transfer in the expectation of the benefits that will 
accrue to both academia and industry. Given the ambiguous results in the literature, it seems 
worthwhile to analyze the conditions under which TTOs generate these benefits as well as how 
benchmark analysis affects the TTOs’ strategy making. 
 
2.2 Aspiration performance and the strategic choices of technology transfer offices (TTOs) 
The success of technology transfer activities depends heavily on the work of the TTO. 
In the case of TTOs, the efficient commercialization of inventions requires high specific 
investments, the creation of efficient organizational structures and the recruiting of highly 
skilled staff. But, do TTOs strive for enhanced performance? Do decision-makers evaluate the 
TTO’s success or failure by benchmarking their own past records or other peers (i.e., TTOs)?  
Existing research specifically addressing technology transfer performance has mostly 
analyzed the effect of variables linked to university inputs (e.g., university size and experience, 
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faculty, research orientation of the university) and various factors related to the TTO (e.g., staff, 
budget, and experience) (Thursby and Kemp 2002; Siegel et al. 2003; Chapple et al. 2005; 
Sellenthin 2009; Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013; Vinig and Lips 2015). 
From an organizational perspective, the success or failure in achieving the set outcomes 
affects managers’ willingness to introduce change (Levitt and March 1988). In this sense, 
performance feedback becomes a potentially critical element that may contribute to understand 
the conditions under which organizations alter their practices or strategies. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of the relationship between benchmarking activities, changes in the strategic orientation 
of the TTO and technology transfer performance remains unaddressed. 
Building on insights from organizational theory, organizational change is primarily 
driven by discrepancies between the organization’s performance aspirations and the feedback it 
receives in terms of its performance (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Levitt and March 1988). 
Performance-feedback theorists argue that businesses initiate change when they are dissatisfied 
with their expected or aspired-to performance level. An aspiration level is a reference point that 
simplifies performance evaluation by transforming business-specific outcome metrics into more 
informative measures of success or failure. Aspiration levels arise from comparisons against 
two reference points that decision makers use to evaluate their own current performance: the 
organization’s own historical performance and performance of the organization’s peer group 
(Levinthal and March 1981; Labianca et al. 2009). 
By definition, TTOs are catalysts of change and innovation. In the context of this study, 
TTOs carry out different tasks related to the management of technology transfer. However, 
resources are unevenly allocated across TTOs and, consequently, TTOs’ performance is also 
heterogeneous across universities. Different patterns are observed based on the relative 
importance given to the different components of TTOs’ objective function in which technology 
transfer is critical. In this setting, the performance aspirations of publicly funded TTOs are more 
linked to the deepening of their technology transfer outputs and the rapid commercialization of 
their innovations, rather than economic results derived from short-term projects.  
Building on performance-feedback models (Levinthal and March 1981; Chen and Miller 
2007), it seems plausible to argue that TTOs cater to the tastes of industry by fueling the market 
with value-adding innovations, and that performance evaluations can play a decisive role in 
shaping TTOs’ strategic paths (Labianca et al. 2009). Benchmarking analyses—i.e., based on 
both the organization’s own historical record and the organization’s reference group—indicate 
whether the organization is performing poorly (below its aspiration level) or better than 
expected (above its aspiration level). 
Regardless the reference group, performance below the aspiration level raises serious 
questions about the legitimacy of organizational practices and creates the need to alter current 
activities (Levitt and March 1988; Greve 1998). TTOs are not the exception. TTOs operate in a 
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competitive environment—the market for knowledge innovations—which increases the 
incentives of managers for using performance feedback as an adaptive behavior mechanism. 
Organizational change is a costly process; however, the presence of more specialized staff—that 
is instrumental to support knowledge transfer tasks—can contribute to a smooth transition 
during the adaptation period that follows the implementation of new strategies (Macho-Stadler 
et al. 2007). Therefore, the depth of the change in the configuration of the TTOs’ output 
portfolio may likely be determined by the degree of specialization of TTO’s resources. 
Poor performance stimulates the vigorous search for new ways to enhance internal 
practices that contribute to move the TTO’s performance closer to its aspiration level (Baum 
and Dahlin 2007). In the context of this study, the objective function of publicly funded TTOs 
describes the maximization of technology transfer outputs. Therefore, we argue that TTOs 
whose performance is below their aspiration level will modify their organizational practices and 
strategic choices, and that these changes will materialize in changes in the configuration of the 
TTOs’ technology transfer outcomes. 
On contrary, can we expect that high-performing TTOs fall into complacency or 
inefficient inertia? Note that the markets of knowledge and innovations are dynamic and highly 
competitive and that TTOs compete for attracting the attention of industries seeking to fund and 
commercialize their innovations. Also, TTOs whose performance is above their aspiration levels 
will likely enjoy a more solid organizational and financial position to engage in continuous 
change practices which makes it difficult for other TTOs to catch-up. This argument is at the 
heart of competitive advantage theories that emphasize that innovativeness often provides the 
potential for the effective development of new products and services, significant changes in the 
organization’s routines and practices, as well as changes in their strategies to compete in the 
market (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Labianca et al. 2009). Thus, according to this competitive 
advantage view, TTOs whose performance is above their aspiration levels will attempt to stay 
ahead of competitors by continuously diversifying their technology transfer activities as a way 
to consolidate their market position (Chen and Miller 2007; Iyer and Miller 2008). Additionally, 
change is a desired policy among successful TTOs—in terms of aspiration performance—
because their mangers will have access to additional resources and abilities to pursue new 
strategic choices linked to the configuration of the TTO’s portfolio (Levinthal and March 1981). 
Although in some contexts competitors’ actions might remain hidden, it should be kept 
in mind that Spanish TTOs must report their activity to the Network of Spanish Technology 
Transfer Offices (RedOTRI). Thus, the experience and technology transfer outcomes of TTOs 
are visible, interpretable based on available information, and generalizable across TTOs. Also, 
because TTOs employ the same basic resources (specialized staff, infrastructures and networks) 
decision makers can gain access to valuable experience created by other publicly funded TTOs. 
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The core of our analysis is to scrutinize the effects on TTOs’ productivity of aspiration-
performance feedback. Taken together, these arguments and evidence suggest that TTOs whose 
performance is below their-own and market aspiration levels will engage in drastic change—in 
terms of their technology transfer portfolio—seeking to improve their performance, while TTOs 
with an above-aspiration performance will intensify and diversify their technology transfer 
activities to consolidate their competitive position. 
 
3. Research context: Technology transfer in Spanish public universities 
In Spain, the higher education system has gone through significant changes during the 
past decades. Before 2001, the Organic Law of Universities (LRU) 11/1983 was the legal 
framework regulating the hiring and contracting of university professors and researchers. This 
law grouped faculty in two main categories: permanent faculty (civil servants) and fixed-term 
faculty (non-civil servants). In 2001 a profound reform took place, and with the new 
Universities Act (LOU, 6/2001) in force universities enjoyed greater autonomy to restructure 
the processes through which academics are hired. Following the enactment of the 2001 
Universities Act, the Spanish Government created in 2002 the Agency for Quality Assessment 
and Accreditation Trust (ANECA). This agency is the main authority within the higher 
education system, which evaluates and endorses the scientific activity of university researchers 
in Spain. The highly decentralized structure of Spain’s institutions facilitated the creation of 
similar agencies with the same attributions in some regions (e.g., Catalonia and Galicia). 
With the new regulatory frame governing universities in place, universities’ research 
orientation is further emphasized, and the parameterization of technology transfer outputs 
facilitates the evaluation of both universities and academics (Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013; 
Lafuente and Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). The primary objective of this evaluation process is to 
ensure that candidates for academic positions have an appropriate level of academic merit. The 
weight assigned to the various components of a CV (i.e. teaching experience, research 
experience, educational background, and work experience) varies according to the teaching 
body (there are several categories), academic discipline and academic position. The higher the 
position, the more important are one’s research credentials (i.e. publication history, research 
projects, technology transfer). Research experience typically accounts for at least half of the 
total score. Particularly, the number of papers published in academic journals is the most 
important criterion valued to accredit professors. Specifically, the weight of scientific 
publications in the final evaluation ranges between 26% and 35% (according to the knowledge 
filed). On the contrary, technology transfer outputs such as patents or spin-offs have a low 
impact, representing between 3% and 12% of the total evaluation score. 
These imbalances on the weights assigned to basic and applied research outputs suggest 
that researchers’ motivation to engage in the different types of technology transfer activities 
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might differ based on their contractual situation. For young academics and professors in a 
weaker contractual position, their academic career will be greatly determined by their capacity 
to publish their research. They have strong incentives to publish in order to create reputational 
signals that will likely increase their probability of being internally promoted (Lafuente and 
Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). To the contrary, full professors have no exogenous incentives to 
publish, and their only motivation is endogenously determined by their own interest in 
conducting research in their knowledge fields. Research conducted by full professors may be 
motivated by knowledge and technology transfer dissemination objectives, the enhancement or 
consolidation of research projects, or by reputational factors (Siegel et al. 2007). 
In Spain TTOs are the units responsible for the management and transfer of technology 
transfer outputs (Caldera and Debande 2010; Guerrero and Urbano 2012). All Spanish public 
universities have an affiliated TTO whose specialized staff provides different services, including 
the quality evaluation of the inventions disclosed by researchers, support for patent application, 
negotiation of licensing contracts, and support for researchers in the creation of spin-offs. 
Concerning the technology transfer intensity of Spanish public universities, data from 
the Spanish Statistical Office (INE: www.ine.es) indicate that universities invested 3.6 billion 
euro on R&D in 2014, of which 39% (1.4 billion euro) came from market sources. Note that the 
universities’ R&D budget represents 35% of their total budget (10.3 billion euro) in the same 
year. Also, figures show that the relevance of TTOs within the university system has grown. 
Information obtained from the Network of Spanish Technology Transfer Offices (RedOTRI: 
www.redotriuniversidades.net) reveals that 50% of the TTOs’ budget came from the universities 
in 2011, while in 2014 this percentage stood at 58%. Private resources represented 22% of the 
TTOs budget in 2011, half of which was generated by university-industry collaboration 
projects. In 2014, university-industry collaboration projects represented 55% of the TTO’s 
budget line referring to private funding which grew to 29% of the total TTOs’ budget. 
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Data 
The data used in this study come from two sources of information. First, we employ the 
reports provided by the Spanish Association of University Rectors (Conferencia de Rectores de 
Universidades Españolas, CRUE). The CRUE databases contain data on the faculty working in 
Spanish public universities. Second, all variables related to knowledge-transfer resources and 
outcomes were collected from the annual reports available from the Network of Spanish 
Technology Transfer Offices (RedOTRI). More concretely, from the RedOTRI reports we 
obtained detailed organizational data on the configuration of the workforce among the sampled 
technology transfer offices, distinguishing between staff specialized in knowledge-transfer areas 
(business start-up process, design of licensing contracts, and intellectual property rights) and 
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administrative support staff. Additionally, this database provides information on the number of 
spin-offs, licenses and patents generated by the study TTOs. 
The database comprises information for all TTOs affiliated to Spanish public 
universities from 2006 to 2011 (47 organizations). Yet, in the interest of following a rigorous 
methodology, three TTOs were excluded from the sample due to lack of reliable information on 
employees and technology transfer outputs (Universidad de Las Palmas, Universidad de León, 
Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena). Therefore, the final sample consists of 44 TTOs for the 
period 2006-2011 (264 observations). 
 
4.2 Efficiency analysis 
When dealing with multiple inputs yielding multiple outputs, efficiency literature often 
makes use of data envelopment analysis (DEA) frontier methods (see, e.g., Cooper et al. 2011; 
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 2015). DEA is a non-parametric technique that, through linear 
programming, approximates the true but unknown technology without imposing any restriction 
on the sample distribution. The primary technological assumption of DEA models is that 
production units (in our case, universities) (i) use a set of 1( ,... )
J
Jx x Rx  inputs to produce a 
set of 1( ,..., )
M
My y Ry  outputs, and that these sets form the technology in the sector (T): 
{( , , ) :  can produce  at time }T t tx y x y . DEA is a complex benchmarking technique that yields 
a production possibilities set where efficient decision-making units positioned on this surface 
shape the frontier. For the rest of units DEA computes an inefficiency score indicating the units’ 
distance to the best practice frontier. 
The technology in DEA models has two properties that are worth defining. First, in this 
study the technology exhibits variable returns to scale (VRS) because pure technical efficiency 
measures (VRS) capture outcomes linked to practices undergone by decision makers in the short 
term (Chambers and Pope 1996). The second assumption deals with the measurement 
orientation (input minimization or output maximization). The proposed DEA model maintains 
an output orientation. Business managers are often given output targets and told to produce 
them most efficiently, that is, with minimum inputs (Sengupta 1987, p. 2290). On contrary, in 
the public sector the workforce and assets tend to be fixed and policy-makers seek to produce 
the maximal possible output given the resources available (Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013). The 
following linear program models the described technology and computes, for each TTO (i) and 
each period (t), the efficiency score via an output distance function ( ( , ))t t ti i iD x y : 
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The drawn technology in equation (1) describes how TTOs transform their available 
resources (x: faculty, TTO staff specialized in technology-transfer activities, and TTO 
administrative support staff)2 into the maximum possible output (y: spin-offs, licenses, and 
patents), uses  as intensity weights to form the linear combinations of the sampled universities 
(N), and introduces the restriction
1
1
N t
ii
 to impose variable returns to scale to the 
technology. The term  is the efficiency score, and for efficient universities 1. For 
inefficient universities 1and 1  points to the degree of inefficiency. 
Next, the distance functions can be used to compute changes in total factor productivity 
(TFP) between two periods through the Malmquist index (M (·)). The Malmquist TFP index 
were first introduced by Malmquist (1953) and has further been developed in the non-
parametric framework by, among others, Caves et al. (1982), Färe and Grosskopf (1989) and 
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999). In a multiple input-output setting, this index reflects changes 
(progress or regress) in productivity along with changes (progress or regress) of the frontier 
technology over time. 
In this study, the output-oriented Malmquist TFP index 1 1( ( , , , ))i t t t tM x y x y  is 
computed for each TTO (i) on the benchmark technologies in period t and t+1 as follows: 
0.50
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , , , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , , , )
t t t t t t t t t
i i i
i t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i i i
i t t t t
D x y D x y D x y
M x y x y
D x y D x y D x y
M x y x y TE TC
  (2) 
 
The estimated TFP index distinguishes between the catch-up effect or the operating 
efficiency change ( )TE —variations in technical efficiency between periods t and t+1—and 
the effect of technical change ( )TC , that is, the shift in technology between the two periods 
(the geometric product of ratios inside the square brackets). Values greater than unity indicate 
productivity growth (progress), while values lower than one point to decline (regress) between 
periods t and t+1. Analogous interpretations hold for the components of the TFP index. 
As we indicated above, TTOs’ productivity paths are evaluated under the premise that 
they capitalize on their specific resources (faculty, TTO staff specialized in technology-transfer 
                                                 
2 It should be kept in mind that, during the analyzed period, reliable data on the TTO’s budget are not 
available from the RedOTRI annual reports for 12 universities. 
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activities, and TTO administrative support staff) to produce technology-transfer outcomes (spin-
offs, licenses, and patents). Note that the selected input-output set matches the theory presented 
in section 2 and is in line with prior work dealing with the performance of TTOs. TTOs are 
intermediaries between suppliers of innovations (university scientists) and those who can 
potentially commercialize the generated knowledge (businesses, entrepreneurs, venture 
capitalists) (Siegel et al. 2007, p. 641). Thus, faculty is a good proxy for the stock of available 
human capital with the capacity to create knowledge with commercial potential. A successful 
technology transfer process heavily relies on the management of intellectual property by TTOs’ 
employees (Macho-Stadler et al. 2007). TTOs with more specialized staff arguably have a 
greater capacity to evaluate and commercialize the knowledge generated by researchers 
(Thursby and Kemp 2002), while administrative staff assists the specialized staff in the day-to-
day activities related to the different technology transfer tasks (Caldera and Debande 2010). 
Concerning the TTOs’ output set, existing research widely supports that TTOs are 
knowledge brokers whose primary objective is the commercialization of knowledge via patents, 
licenses, and university-based spin-offs (Thursby and Kemp 2002; Chappel et al. 2005; Siegel et 
al. 2007; Caldera and Debande 2010; Algieri et al., 2013; Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013)  
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics for the input-output set. Note that in our 
sample some TTOs report zero data values in the output set. More concretely, during the 
analyzed period nine TTOs report zero spin-offs, while five and two TTOs did not create any 
license or patent, respectively. Much has been said about how to handle ‘badly behaved data’ in 
DEA models (see, e.g., Thanassoulis et al. 2008). In fact, zero output values present no 
computational problems in DEA models and the estimated efficiency scores are technically 
feasible (Podinovski and Thanassoulis 2007, p. 119). From an economic perspective, zero 
output values only point to the ineffective consumption of resources by a focal unit which 
translates into the production of zero outputs.3 Also, it is worth mentioning that in our dataset 
the output vector (y) for all TTOs is positive (y > 0) in all periods. Although some TTOs report 
zero values in some outputs, all TTOs in the sample report the production of at least one 
technology transfer output during the analyzed period (2006-2011). 
 
----- Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ----- 
 
4.3 Second stage analysis: Aspiration-performance feedback and portfolio configuration 
The second stage analysis evaluates the relationship between productivity and aspiration 
performance among TTOs affiliated to public universities. To this end, note that we employ 
                                                 
3 Although it is not the case in our data, we extend the analysis to the case of zero values in the input set. 
Zero input values are problematic in DEA models. From an economic point of view, zero input values 
indicate that the focal unit can produce outputs without consuming resources, which leads to unfeasible 
DEA scores (see Thanassoulis et al. (2008) for a comprehensive review on this issue). 
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vector algebra to operationalize the portfolio of technology transfer outcomes. The complexity 
of the TTO’s portfolio increases with the number of products in a given category (spin-offs, 
licenses and patents). Based on vector algebra, we undertook a pairwise comparison by 
calculating cosine values between the vectors of two TTOs ( , )i kf f  across all technology 
transfer outcomes (y) in the sector at period t. 
1
2 2
1 1
,
Configuration of TTO portfolio
N
i ki k i
N N
i k i ki i
f f
f f
y y
y y
   (3) 
 
In equation (3), the vector of the number of products in each category (y) for each 
TTO ( )if  was compared to the vector of values of the rest of TTOs ( )kf  in the same category. 
As the angle between the vectors shortens, the cosine value approaches 1 indicating that the 
vector of technology transfer outputs produced by the two TTOs is more similar. 
For example, let’s consider the case of a fictitious TTO ( )if  whose vector of outputs is 
[0,1,2], that is, the focal TTO does not produce any output in the first category (spin-offs), 
produces one output in the second category (licenses) and produces two outputs in the third 
category (patents). Similarly, for a reference TTO 1( )kf , the vector of outputs is [1,2,3]. 
Following equation (3), the cosine value for the comparison of the two TTOs is computed 
as
8
0.96
0 1 4 1 4 9
. Now suppose a second reference TTO with a similar number 
of outputs but with a different configuration [3,2,1]. In this case, the cosine value between the 
focal TTO ( )if  and the reference TTO 2( )kf  is
4
0.48
0 1 4 9 4 1
. Although the 
reference TTOs 1 2( , )k kf f  have the same total number of outputs, the configuration of the 
output portfolio—based on the relative weight of each category in the output mix—of the focal 
TTO ( )if  is more similar to 1kf  than 2kf . 
Therefore, the proposed measure of portfolio configuration allows at differentiating 
three dimensions of TTO outputs: length (total output), breadth (categories), and depth 
(relevance of categories in the output mix based on the quantity of output in each category). In 
line with the arguments presented in section 2.2, this variable permits us to assess the extent to 
which TTOs benchmark their-own’ and other TTOs’ performance and how productivity is 
affected by strategic actions resulting from the analysis of TTOs’ aspiration performance levels. 
For each period, we measure the TTO-specific aspiration performance (AP
TTO
) as the 
value of the configuration of the TTO portfolio minus its-own average value for the period prior 
the focal year of analysis. To allow for different slopes above and below aspiration levels, we 
split APTTO into two variables: 1) APTTO > 0 equals to zero for TTOs where performance is 
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below their-own performance aspirations, and equals APTTO otherwise; 2) APTTO < 0 is zero for 
TTOs where performance is above their aspirations, and equals APTTO otherwise. 
Likewise, for each TTO we defined the market aspiration level (APMKT) as the value of 
the configuration of the TTO portfolio minus the performance of other TTOs, that is, the 
average value of the configuration of the TTO portfolio for each period. Again, to permit 
different slopes for values above and below the aspiration level, we split APMKT into two 
variables: 1) APMKT > 0 equals to APMKT for TTOs where performance is above market 
aspirations (and zero otherwise); 2) APMKT < 0 is zero for TTOs where performance is above 
market aspirations, and equals APMKT otherwise. 
Additionally, we introduce a set of control variables commonly found in studies dealing 
with technology transfer performance (Friedman and Silberman 2003; Wright et al. 2007; 
Ambos et al. 2008; Agasisti and Wolszczak-Derlacz 2015; Vinig and Lips 2015). University 
size is measured by the total faculty, while university age is introduced as a proxy of market 
experience. The size and experience of the TTO is measured as the total staff and age, 
respectively. For both universities and TTOs, note that the variables related to size and 
experience are logged to reduce skewness. To account for the potential benefits derived from 
the presence of technology transfer intermediate organizations, we introduced a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the university has a science parks, and zero otherwise. A dummy 
variable taking the value of one for polytechnic universities takes into account the potentially 
greater marketability of engineering-based inventions, compared to inventions from other 
disciplines. Time dummy variables are introduced to control for time trends (in all models 2011 
is the base year). Finally, and similar to prior work (Chappel et al. 2005; Siegel et al., 2007), we 
include a set of regional dummies to rule out the potential effects of economic and other 
environmental conditions that may affect TTOs’ productivity (in all models Madrid is the 
omitted category). Descriptive statistics for the study variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
----- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
 
We employ panel data techniques to estimate the proposed model which emphasizes a 
relationship between aspiration performance and universities’ technology transfer productivity. 
Pooling repeated observations on the same organizations violate the assumption of 
independence of observations, resulting in autocorrelation in the residuals. First-order 
autocorrelation occurs when the disturbances in one time period are correlated with those in the 
previous time period, resulting in incorrect variance estimates, rendering ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates inefficient and biased (Wooldridge 2002). Therefore, we estimate random-
effects (GLS) panel data models with robust standard errors to correct for autocorrelation of 
error terms due to constant university-specific effects (Greene 2003). Additionally, the proposed 
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estimation approach allows at evaluating the effect of relevant time-invariant factors on 
technology transfer productivity. To evaluate the role of aspiration performance empirically we 
propose a random-effects model with the following form: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
TFP AP 0 AP 0 AP 0 AP 0
        Control variables
TTO TTO MKT MKT
it it it it it
it t itT
  (4) 
 
In equation (4) TFP is the Malmquist TFP index computed from equation (2), j  are 
parameter estimates estimated for the independent variables (j),  is the normally distributed 
error term that varies cross-universities and cross-time (t), while T refers to the set of time 
dummy variables. 
We estimated the Hausman (1978) specification test to further validate the 
appropriateness of the proposed regression models. Results for model 1 (Hausman test: 4.97 and 
p-value<0.89) and model 2 (Hausman test: 6.95 and p-value<0.86) indicate that random effects 
estimations are independent of university-specific effects—i.e., regressors are consistent—thus 
confirming that random-effects coefficients are consistent and efficient (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Productivity assessment of Spanish Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) 
This section presents the results of the efficiency analysis. Table 4 shows the summary 
statistics of the Malmquist TFP results, while Appendix 1 presents the productivity results for 
the analyzed Spanish publicly funded TTOs. Overall, the findings in Table 4 and Figure 1 reveal 
that, on average, the analyzed TTOs improved their productivity level by 4%, and that 
technology transfer productivity declined after 2009 to the level of 1.73% in the period 2010-
2011. 
 
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----- 
 
Additionally, Figure 2 shows the results for the components of the Malmquist TFP 
index. The dotted line in the figure shows the operating efficiency change, which is linked to the 
catching-up effect and is computed for each university as the difference in the distance to the 
efficiency frontier between period t and t+1. The technical change (continuous line in Figure 2) 
captures the shift in the frontier between period t and t+1, thus unveiling the progress or regress 
of the analyzed TTOs with similar input-output configurations. Results in the figure show that 
technology transfer productivity is mainly driven by positive shifts in the efficiency frontier (on 
average 2.54%), with the exception of the period 2007-2008 where the technology transfer 
frontier regressed by 3.58%. 
 17 
 
Consistent with the period of economic downturn that characterized Spain’s economy, 
Spanish public TTOs show a fall in operating efficiency after 2009, that is, their distance to the 
technology transfer frontier has increased (deteriorated) between period t and t+1 as a result of 
the ineffective utilization of resources in the production of technology-transfer outcomes. 
 
----- Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here ----- 
 
A closer look at the results reveals that the number of efficient universities placed on the 
technology transfer frontier varies between 13 (2009) and seven (2011). We also note that five 
TTOs affiliated to public universities consistently shape the technology transfer frontier, that is, 
they are efficient in four or five periods: Universidad of Sevilla, University of Salamanca, 
Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Polytechnic University of Valencia, and Polytechnic 
University of Madrid. 
These TTOs are benchmark targets for inefficient TTOs, and they show a greater 
average level of technology transfer outputs, compared to inefficient institutions: 4.63 spin-offs 
(inefficient universities: 2.14 spin-offs), 9.83 licenses (inefficient universities: 3.30 licenses), 
and 13.74 patents (inefficient universities: 5.71 patents). For each technology transfer output, 
the comparison of the average values between efficient and inefficient TTOs is statistically 
significant at 1% level (Kruskal-Wallis test). 
Finally we note that efficient TTOs affiliated to polytechnic institutions report the 
highest level of technology transfer outputs (spin-offs: 7.46, licenses: 15.80, and patents: 22.80). 
This result is in line with prior research emphasizing the superior technology transfer orientation 
of TTOs working in universities with close ties to the industry, such as polytechnics and 
institutions with engineering schools (see e.g., Siegel et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2007; Caldera 
and Debande 2010; Perkerman et al. 2013). 
 
5.2 Second stage analysis: Aspiration performance and technology transfer productivity 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the random-effects regression models linking aspiration 
performance and technology transfer productivity. Model 1 is the baseline specification which 
includes the aspiration performance levels and the control variables. Model 2 includes the main 
effects of aspiration performance based on both TTO-specific and market levels. 
To address the threat of collinearity, we computed the average variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for all variables. The average VIF value for model 1 2.66 and ranges between 1.32 and 
6.89, while for model 2 the average VIF is 2.77 (ranging between 1.33 and 7.91). Note that all 
the VIF values do not exceed 10—a generally accepted rule of thumb for assessing collinearity. 
The results for this diagnostic test do not raise collinearity concerns. 
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----- Insert Table 5 about here ----- 
 
To aid in the interpretation of the results, we plot the aspiration performance variables 
based on estimates from model 2 (equation (4)). The results are presented in Figure 3. The 
vertical axis indicates the estimated technology transfer productivity, and the horizontal axis 
indicates the aspiration performance levels. Control variables are set at their sample means. 
 
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ----- 
 
Concerning the key results of the analysis, from model 1 in Table 5 we note that the 
coefficient for own aspiration performance is positive and statistically significant (APTTO = 
0.0164 and p-value < 1%). This result indicates that TTOs whose technology transfer portfolio 
is above their own aspiration performance level show higher levels of technology transfer 
productivity. Therefore, increased complexity in the TTO’s technology transfer portfolio 
enhances productivity. The pattern of own aspiration performance in model 2 of Table 5 
suggests that technology transfer productivity increases for TTOs that increase the complexity 
of their technology transfer portfolio. One possible explanation for this result is that TTOs 
benchmark their own aspiration level to introduce changes in their technology transfer portfolio, 
irrespective of whether the TTO’s portfolio is below or above their own aspiration level. This 
result is in line with the competitive advantage view of organizational change that underlines the 
role of change based on own aspiration levels to consolidate market positioning (Iyer and Miller 
2008). This indicates that TTOs benchmark the outcomes of their own portfolio, and that 
increased diversification in the TTOs’ portfolio with respect to their own aspiration level yields 
superior productivity results. 
Figure 3 graphically illustrates that the relationship between aspiration performance and 
productivity is steeper below the TTO’s performance aspirations. That is, the relative slope and 
magnitude of the effect of performance below aspirations 1( 0.0278 and value 1%)p  is 
greater than that estimated for performance above own aspiration level 
1( 0.0126 and value 10%)p . This finding indicates that productivity improvements that 
follow changes in the configuration of the technology transfer portfolio are greater when 
performance is below the TTOs’ own aspirations. Managers tend to react more strongly to 
threats than to opportunities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and performance below aspirations 
stimulates the search of new ways of doing things (Greve 1998). Thus, this result suggests that 
managers of TTOs whose performance is far from their own aspirations are more open to 
promote changes in resource allocation practices and, consequently, in the configuration of their 
technology transfer portfolio with the objective to raise productivity closer to their aspirations. 
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In contrast, TTO actively engaging in technology transfer activities above market 
aspiration show a significant deterioration in their technology transfer productivity (model 2 in 
Table 5: 1 0.0103 and value 5%p ). Following the decomposition of the Malmquist 
index presented in equation (2), this result may well originate from variations in operating 
efficiency (TE) or from shifts in the technology (TC). Variations in the operating efficiency 
component (TE) are linked to the exploitation of available resources as it indicates if the focal 
TTO is moving closer or farther away from the efficiency frontier (catch-up effect); while 
technical change (TC) measures the shift in the technology frontier resulting from decision-
making processes—in terms of resource exploitation and output production—and from the 
introduction of cutting-edge technologies (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell 1999). Thus, by analyzing 
the components of the Malmquist index we can test whether the negative effect on productivity 
of portfolio’s complexity above market aspirations comes from an inefficient use of resources 
(variations in TE), or from factors linked to technical change (TC) that can be related to 
organizational inertia, such as the ineffective introduction of new technologies and the 
development of strategies or policy-driven actions associated with the greater (or lower) 
exploitation or specific resources.4 
Looking at the results we note that the productivity level of TTOs whose portfolio’s 
configuration is below market aspirations (Malmquist index: 1.09) is significantly higher than 
that reported for TTOs whose portfolio’s complexity is above market aspirations (Malmquist 
index: 0.96) (Kruskal-Wallis test: 11.30, p-value < 0.001). An examination of the productivity 
components reveals that this gap is caused by significant differences in operating efficiency 
(TE) (Kruskal-Wallis test: 4.75, p-value = 0.028): TTOs whose portfolio’s complexity is below 
market aspirations = 1.05, TTOs whose portfolio’s complexity is above market aspirations = 
0.95. The comparison of the technical change (TC) component between the two groups yields a 
not significant result (Kruskal-Wallis test: 2.33, p-value = 0.127). 
Instead of organizational inertia (Iyer and Miller, 2008), these findings indicate that 
greater diversification of TTOs’ portfolio may increase the complexity of the operational tasks 
necessary to generate technology transfer outcomes, which causes the reported falls in the 
productivity level of TTOs whose portfolio reports a complexity level above market aspirations. 
 
6. Discussion 
At the organizational level, change is difficult but necessary. Nevertheless, 
organizational change entails inherent risks (Labianca et al. 2009). Therefore, the analysis of the 
                                                 
4 Literature on the definition and causes of technical change is extensive. In this study, technical change 
refers to shifts of the production function in the input-output space that originate from different 
combinations in the input-mix and the output-mix. In the context of non-parametric productivity models, 
a more in-depth analysis of technical change can be found in Kumar and Russell (2002) and Grifell-Tatjé 
and Lovell (2015). 
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processes underlying organizational change is critical to understand the trade-offs between 
resource allocation policies and the subsequent change in organizational performance. Our 
result that changes in the TTOs’ portfolio based on the benchmarking of other TTOs may cause 
unintended negative effects on productivity confirms this argument. We argue that this result 
may reflect that changes in the TTOs’ technology transfer portfolio modify operational tasks 
and the way the TTOs exploit their resources. 
Prior work often assumes that organizations benchmark their market peers to form their 
performance aspiration levels, thus ignoring the possibility that organizations mirror to 
themselves when it comes to create their performance aspirations (Chen and Miller 2007). We 
show that, among TTOs, enhanced productivity follows organizational change based on the 
TTOs’ own historical performance. The findings are in line with studies emphasizing that 
superior performance is not exclusively linked to the use of market peers or industry average 
values as reference points (Baum and Dahlin 2007; Labianca et al. 2009). This result indicates 
that, in their search for non-local information, TTO managers might be constrained by focusing 
on a limited number of potentially similar TTOs and strategic factors. By benchmarking 
heterogeneous TTOs—in terms of both available resources and the configuration of their 
technology-transfer portfolio—managers may adopt strategic actions that are not compatible 
with the configuration of their resources, which translate into ineffective changes in the TTOs’ 
operations and, consequently, poor productivity results. 
On contrary, the positive effects on TFP of changes in the TTOs’ portfolio based on 
internal information may well reflect an effective resource exploitation policy. TTOs have 
strong incentives to modify the configuration of their technology-transfer portfolio, irrespective 
of whether their performance is above or below their own aspiration level. By benchmarking 
their own historical record, TTOs generate changes more aligned with the configuration of their 
input-output set, thus incurring in lower adaptation costs. For example, internal actions that may 
strengthen the TTO’s productivity include the support of team work dynamics among 
employees, as well as the introduction of both training programs and continuous improvement 
processes that emphasize learning. These actions may constitute a source of competitive 
advantage (Baum and Dahlin 2007). Also, the exploitation of these factors signals the extent to 
which TTOs strive for superior performance apart from external comparisons. 
 
7. Concluding remarks, implications and directions for future research 
In this study, we propose that TTOs’ technology transfer productivity is a function of 
scientists’ human capital and TTO’s specific resources. Furthermore, we argue that the role of 
TTOs as driving force of change, along with differences in the configuration of the TTO’s 
output portfolio, have implications for the productivity of TTOs affiliated to public universities. 
Our approach offers a compelling vision of how TTOs seek to enhance their productivity levels 
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through strategic actions linked to changes in the configuration of their technology transfer 
portfolio. Overall, results suggest that the productivity of Spanish publicly funded TTOs 
improved, on average, 4% between 2006 and 2011 and that, coinciding with the economic 
slowdown in Spain, technology transfer productivity declined between 2009 and 2011. 
The findings of this study have relevant academic and policy implications. As any 
organization, TTOs engage in different performance-enhancing strategic actions. However, we 
find that the maximization of all types of technology transfer outputs should not necessarily be 
the objective of TTOs affiliated to public universities. These results fuel the academic debate on 
both the multidimensionality of TTOs’ objective function (Siegel et al. 2007; Vinig and Lips 
2015) and the need to match TTOs’ objectives with those of the different stakeholders that take 
part of technology transfer processes (Kim 2013; Fitzgerald and Cunningham 2016). Our results 
have also implications for the closely related literature on performance feedback models (Greve 
1998; Baum and Dahlin 2007; Labianca et al. 2009). By linking benchmarking to TTOs’ 
strategic choices that materialize in changes in the configuration of TTOs’ output portfolio, our 
analysis shows that benchmarking own and other peers have different impacts on productivity. 
By definition, TTOs are catalysts of change and innovation, and the successful 
commercialization of inventions requires specific investments, in the case of TTOs the creation 
of efficient organizational structures and the recruiting of highly skilled staff who support the 
transfer of new knowledge to the industry. Our results suggesting that enhanced productivity 
follows organizational change based on the evaluation of the TTOs’ own historical record 
contribute to better understand how performance feedback impacts TTOs’ strategy making and, 
consequently, subsequent productivity. 
We suggest that policy makers and TTO managers need to turn their attention to the 
characteristics of the TTO’s operational processes when considering the introduction of 
strategic changes that will modify the TTO’s technology transfer portfolio. Drastic changes in 
the configuration of the technology transfer portfolio as a result of the benchmarking of own 
and market aspiration levels have different effects on productivity. The analysis of the 
productivity patterns of TTOs reveals that benchmark own performance might promote efficient 
changes of TTOs’ output portfolio, thus leading to superior TFP levels. On contrary, 
benchmarking market peers—other TTOs—might prove itself ineffective to enhance technology 
transfer productivity. Therefore, the prioritization of changes in the technology transfer portfolio 
based on the market aspiration levels may increase operational costs, which is detrimental to 
both learning and productivity (Chen and Miller 2007; Iyer and Miller 2008). Additionally, our 
results underline the relevance of internal analyses. By conducting a profound analysis of 
available resources TTO managers will be in a better position both for understanding the 
potential value of benchmarking different targets (internal or external) and for determining the 
strategy making of TTOs. 
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It must, however, be mentioned a series of limitations to the present study that, in turn, 
represent avenues for future research. First, like other studies on productivity (see, e.g., 
Berbegal-Mirabent et al. 2013; Agasisti and Wolszczak-Derlacz 2015), the data do not permit 
the direct analysis of the underlying technology transfer process. We present various 
interpretations of how productivity is conditioned by TTOs’ practices; however, we do not 
evaluate how productivity varies at different stages of the knowledge generation process, nor do 
we assess the processes through which scientists generate—individually or collectively—new 
knowledge and channel it to the TTO. Further research on this issue would be valuable. For 
example, future studies should evaluate the researchers’ response to incentives created by TTOs, 
and determine both the conditions under which academics engage in technology transfer 
activities and how the TTOs’ operations affect these processes. Second, the analyzed period 
definitely influences our productivity estimates. Publicly funded TTOs were severely damaged 
by the budget cuts that followed the economic downturn that affects Spain after 2008. In this 
sense, future research should evaluate our argument on the differentiated impact on TTOs’ 
productivity of different benchmarking strategies using more updated data. Finally, cultural 
contexts, different regulatory frameworks, and variations in the flexibility and development of 
technology transfer activities affect the TTOs’ policies and their productivity. The geographic 
specificity of the study calls for obvious caution when interpreting and generalizing its findings. 
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Figure 2. Operating efficiency and technical change 
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Table 1. Technology transfer efficiency of Spanish public TTOs: Descriptive statistics for the 
input-output set 
 Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs     
(x1) Faculty 2132.54 1299.38 446 7539 
(x2) TTO technology-transfer staff 2.61 1.81 1 11 
(x3) TTO administrative staff 12.49 12.61 1 92 
     
Outputs     
(y1) Spinoffs 2.68 3.57 0 22 
(y2) Patents 6.53 7.46 0 47 
(y3) Licenses 4.34 7.10 0 72 
Number of observations: 264 (44 observations during 2006-2011). 
 
Table 2. Technology transfer efficiency of Spanish public TTOs: Descriptive statistics for the 
input-output set between 2006 and 2011 
 x1: 
Faculty 
x2:  
TTO 
technology-
transfer staff 
x3:  
TTO 
administrative 
staff 
y1: 
Spinoffs 
y2:  
Patents 
y3: 
Licenses 
2006 1988.26 2.10 12.44 3.41 4.27 4.32 
2007 2031.20 2.35 12.30 2.70 4.82 4.23 
2008 2078.07 2.59 12.82 2.36 4.80 3.84 
2009 2124.93 2.61 13.08 2.61 6.02 3.98 
2010 2249.91 2.82 11.72 2.73 9.50 4.64 
2011 2322.89 3.18 12.55 2.27 9.80 5.02 
Total 2132.54 2.61 12.49 2.68 6.53 4.34 
Number of observations: 264 (44 observations during 2006-2011). 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the selected variables (2006-2011) 
 Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Configuration of the technology transfer 
portfolio 
32.35 6.17 11.91 41.46 
TTO-specific aspiration performance 
(APTTO) 
2.45 5.47 –17.56 14.95 
Market aspiration performance (APMKT) 0.82 5.08 –16.55 7.15 
TTO size (total staff) 15.09 13.46 3 94 
TTO age (years) 18.00 4.00 5 28 
University size (faculty) 2,161.40 1,314.47 446 7,539 
University age (years) 141.34 224.33 10 793 
Science park 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Polytechnic university 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Number of observations: 264 (44 observations during 2006-2011). 
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Table 4. Malmquist TFP index: Results 
 Malmquist index 
(TFP) 1 1( ( , , , ))t t t tM x y x y  
Technical 
change ( )TE  
Technological 
change ( )TC  
2007 1.1040 1.0134 1.0733 
2008 0.9892 1.0234 0.9642 
2009 1.0684 1.0456 1.0254 
2010 1.0213 0.9758 1.0546 
2011 1.0173 1.0052 1.0095 
Total 1.0400 1.0127 1.0254 
Number of observations: 220 (44 observations during 2007-2011). 
 
 
Table 5. Regression results: The relationship between aspiration performance and technology 
transfer productivity 
 Model 1 Model 2 
TTO-specific aspiration performance 
(APTTO) 
  0.0164 (0.0061)***  
Market aspiration performance (APMKT) –0.0061 (0.0067)  
TTO-specific aspiration performance 
(APTTO) < 0 
   0.0278 (0.0096)*** 
TTO-specific aspiration performance 
(APTTO) > 0 
   0.0126 (0.0073)* 
Market aspiration performance (APMKT) < 0  –0.0075 (0.0128) 
Market aspiration performance (APMKT) > 0  –0.0103 (0.0048)** 
University size (ln faculty) –0.0112 (0.0059)* –0.0114 (0.0067)* 
University age (ln years) –0.0085 (0.0195) –0.0130 (0.0191) 
TTO size (ln total staff) –0.0262 (0.0490) –0.0218 (0.0115) 
TTO age (ln years)   0.0718 (0.0990)   0.0746 (0.1036) 
Science park   0.0731 (0.0598)   0.0682 (0.0618) 
Polytechnic university   0.0912 (0.0481)*   0.0867 (0.0509)* 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Intercept   0.8786 (0.3903)**   0.8435 (0.3794)** 
Wald test (chi2) 47.67*** 48.43*** 
R2 (overall) 0.1254 0.1296 
Hausman specification test 4.97 (p = 0.89) 6.95 (p = 0.86) 
Average VIF (minimum – maximum) 2.66 (1.32–6.89) 2.77 (1.33–7.91) 
Observations 220 220 
Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Malmquist TFP results of Spanish public technology transfer offices (2007-2011) 
N Technology Transfer Office 
Average 
TFP 
 N Technology Transfer Office 
Average 
TFP 
1 Universidad de Almería 1.1728  23 
Universitat Politècnica de 
Catalunya 
1.1023 
2 Universidad de Cádiz 0.9545  24 Universitat Pompeu Fabra 0.9296 
3 Universidad de Córdoba 1.1583  25 Universitat Rovira i Virgili 1.0613 
4 Universidad de Granada 1.0628  26 Universidad de Alicante 1.0673 
5 Universidad de Huelva 1.1588  27 Universitat Jaume I 0.9575 
6 Universidad de Jaén 0.9086  28 
Universidad Miguel 
Hernández 
1.2476 
7 Universidad de Málaga 1.0542  29 
Universitat Politècnica de 
Valencia 
0.8764 
8 
Universidad Pablo de 
Olavide (Sevilla) 
1.0744  30 
Universitat de Valencia 
Estudi General 
1.0395 
9 Universidad de Sevilla 1.0457  31 
Universidad de 
Extremadura 
0.8676 
10 Universidad de Zaragoza 0.9492  32 Universidad de la Coruña 1.0738 
11 Universidad de Oviedo 0.9316  33 
Universidade de Santiago 
de Compostela 
1.0842 
12 Universitat Illes Balears 0.8988  34 Universidade de Vigo 1.0423 
13 Universidad de La Laguna 0.9582  35 
Universidad de Alcalá de 
Henares 
0.8733 
14 Universidad de Cantabria 0.9030  36 
Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid 
0.9402 
15 
Universidad Castilla-La 
Mancha 
0.9202  37 
Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid 
1.1497 
16 Universidad de Burgos 0.8821  38 
Universidad Complutense 
de Madrid 
1.3063 
17 Universidad de Salamanca 1.0026  39 
Universidad Politécnica de 
Madrid 
1.3581 
18 Universidad de Valladolid 0.9802  40 
Universidad Rey Juan 
Carlos 
0.9886 
19 
Universitat Autónoma de 
Barcelona 
1.0237  41 Universidad de Murcia 1.1727 
20 Universitat de Barcelona 1.0156  42 
Universidad Pública de 
Navarra 
1.2459 
21 Universitat de Girona 0.9986  43 
Universidad del País 
Vasco/ Euskal Herriko 
Unibertsitatea 
0.9851 
22 Universitat de Lleida 0.9120  44 Universidad de La Rioja 0.9264 
Note: The column ‘Average TFP’ is the Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index computed from 
equation (2). Average values between 2007 and 2011 are presented in the table. 
 
